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Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?
Gilles Cuniberti*

ABSTRACT

The Convention on Contracts for International Sale of
Goods (CISG) was supposed to increase legal certainty and
reduce the transaction costs of internationalbuyers and sellers.
This Article argues that none of these goals has been met. A
survey of 181 court decisions and arbitralawards applying the
CISG shows that the vast majority of internationalbuyers and
sellers do not address the issue of the law governing their
contracts, irrespectiveof the value at stake. Although the data is
not easy to interpret, it follows that international buyers and
sellers are simply not concerned with the legal regime governing
their contracts and may be more generally legally
unsophisticated. As a consequence, increasing legal certainty
does not benefit them ex ante, and they do not incur the
transactioncosts that a harmonizationof the law of sales could
save. It is true that a few of these parties do provide for the
applicable law and seem to be more sophisticated. But this
Article further argues that even these parties do not clearly
benefit from the internationalharmonization of the applicable
law because of its limited scope.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Governments have conducted a process of harmonization of
international sale law for more than forty years.1 Legal scholars had
advocated the idea since the 1920s. 2 Today, international sales law is
harmonized to a very significant extent through the United Nations
(U.N.) Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods
(CISG). 3 This uniform law is applicable in sixty-six states, which
include most of the major trading nations. 4 It governs many areas of
sale law, particularly the performance of the contract. 5
Because the process of harmonization has been supported for
almost a century, and because so many countries have adopted the
CISG, it has become increasingly hard to challenge the usefulness of
the whole enterprise. Indeed, most modern treatises on international
6
sale law either state that the benefits of harmonization are obvious
7
or do not even find the issue worth addressing.

1.

The first Hague Conventions on the sale of goods date back to 1964. See

COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1 (Peter

Schlechtriem ed., 1998) [hereinafter Schlechteriem].
2.
Id.
3.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 [hereinafter CISG].
4.
The United Kingdom and Japan are not parties. Michael Bridge, The UK
Sales of Goods Act, the CISG and the Unidroit Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS REVISITED 115, 117 (Petar Sarvcevic & Paul Volken eds., 2001). Yet

becoming so seems to be favored by their legal elites, and thus it is probably only a
matter of time. See id. On the relatively little interest in the English business
community and thus in the U.K government to ratify the CISG, see Sally Moss, Why
the United Kingdom Has Not Ratified the CISG, 25 J.L. & COM. 483 (2005-06).
5.
It does not govern the validity of the contract or any of its clauses nor the
transfer of ownership. CISG, supranote 3, at art. 4.
6.
See C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 3 (1987).
7.
See VINCENT HEUzt, LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES (2000)
(Fr.); JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1999); Schlechtriem, supra note 1.
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Yet, some scholars have recently challenged the usefulness of the
CISG.8 They have argued that the poor quality of harmonization that
it has achieved makes it doubtful that it has been beneficial to
commercial parties. However, none of these scholars have challenged
the usefulness of the process itself.9 This Article will address that
issue. For a century, the supporters of international sale law have
argued that an instrument such as the CISG would have significant
benefits for international sellers and buyers. 10 The CISG has
governed international sales for more than fifteen years.'1 It is now
possible to review cases in which the CISG was applied and to use
these cases to test the century-old hypothesis of the usefulness of
harmonizing sales law.
This Article examines whether harmonizing international sale
law has been a useful enterprise from two perspectives. Part II lists
the arguments put forward by the supporters of international sale
law, explores whether they are convincing, and concludes that most of
them are not. Part III examines 181 cases where the CISG was
applied by U.S., German, and French courts and by arbitral tribunals
to determine whether international buyers and sellers have actually
benefited from the CISG. This analysis finds that the vast majority of
those buyers and sellers have not benefited, due to a lack of
sophistication.
Part IV considers whether the CISG could be
beneficial to a few sophisticated parties but finds the benefits difficult
to assess and possibly nonexistent. Part V concludes the Article.

II.

THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE HARMONIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SALE LAW

The negotiators of the CISG thought that engaging in a process
of unification of international sale law would increase international
trade. The preamble of the CISG provides that the Convention set out
to "contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade

8.

See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of

International Sales Law, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, The

Futility of Unification and Harmonizationin International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 743 (1999).

9.
Although Gillette and Scott do not argue for abandoning the CISG, they
propose competition between national commercial laws as an alternative. Gillette &
Scott, supra note 8, at 480-84.
10.

See generally BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 6, at 3-7 (giving a history of

attempts to harmonize International Sale Law dating back to 1929); Stephan, supra
note 8, at 744-46.
11.
Its entry into force among the first states that ratified it dates back to
January 1, 1988. Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 451.
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and promote the development of international trade." 12 In his
address on the Convention to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in April 1984, Peter Pfund, who was acting as Assistant
Legal Adviser for Private International Law for the Department of
State, also supported the adoption of the CISG by the United States
on the grounds that it would allow U.S. corporations to engage in
trade with foreign nations and conclude sales that they would not
have concluded otherwise. 13 He argued that without the CISG, U.S.
corporations would be discouraged by the uncertainties and costs of
the determination of the legal regime governing the contract and by
14
litigating contractual disputes abroad.
The negotiators of the CISG seem to have considered that the
CISG enterprise would increase international trade by facilitating the
conclusion of international sales. Indeed, legal scholars have
essentially justified the unification of international sale law since
then by claiming that the CISG improves the legal environment in
which international sales are concluded by increasing legal certainty
and reducing transaction costs. 1 5 Some scholars have also suggested
that the CISG has been an occasion for law reform. 16 This Article will
examine and discuss these arguments in turn.
A. Legal Certainty
Legal scholars
ordinarily justify the unification and
harmonization of international sale law on purely legal grounds. Most
commonly, they argue that an instrument such as the CISG increases
legal certainty, as they believe that the applicability of different
17
national laws has the "obvious consequence" of impairing it,
and
thus that the CISG must be an improvement.
Yet it is not so easy to see why the adoption of the CISG has
increased legal certainty. To begin with, it is unclear to which legal
certainty supporters of the CISG refer. Arguably, legal certainty
could be harmed in an international context for two reasons. First, it
could be difficult to determine which law governs the contract.

12.
CISG, supra note 3, pmbl.
13.
International Sale of Goods, 1984: Hearing on Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 Before
the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 98th Cong. 303-05 (1984).
14.
See Heidi Stanton, How to Be or Not to Be: The United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, Article 6, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 423, 428 (1996).
15.
16.

BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. at 7; FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES

LAW 1-2 (1992).
17.
BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 6, at 3; see also FRANCO FERRARI,
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1, 3 (1999); MARCO TORSELLO, COMMON FEATURES OF

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW CONVENTIONS 1-2 (2004); Stephan, supra note 8, at 746.
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Second, the applicable law could be unclear or imprecise and thus
make the substantive legal regime less certain.
One can doubt that the adoption of the CISG has increased legal
certainty on the first account. It is true that the CISG applies
automatically when the contracting parties have their places of
business in two different contracting states. 18 According to the
Convention, the applicable legal regime can therefore be determined
without resorting to international private law. However, it is doubtful
that the CISG has significantly increased legal certainty. The choice
of law rule which applied in contractual matters before the CISG
19
allowed the parties who were concerned with legal certainty to
determine with the greatest precision the legal regime governing
their contract. All they needed to do was to include a choice of law
clause in their contract to that effect. Conflict of laws is often
presented as a complex area of the law, but here the rule is very
simple. It is true that the parties could fail to choose the applicable
law, and that the default conflict rule would usually be and still is
both very unpredictable and complex. Yet, if the parties were not
sufficiently concerned by the issue of the applicable law to make that
choice, it may well be that they were actually not very concerned with
legal certainty, at least at the time of conclusion of the contract, and
that the harmonization of sales law would not be useful to them if it
only aimed at increasing legal certainty. Furthermore, although rare
in today's world, it is perfectly conceivable to design simple and
predictable default conflict rules. The 1955 Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, which still applies in
France and in Italy for instance, is a good example: it provides for the
application of the law of the seller without giving any discretion to
the court applying it. 20 If such a rule had been adopted worldwide,
legal certainty would have been achieved as effectively as through a
process such as the CISG. Moreover, the CISG has only partially
harmonized sales law. For instance, the Convention does not apply to
the validity of the contract or of any of its clauses. 21 Therefore, it
remains necessary to determine the law governing the contract if the
issue of validity arises. 22 In a system relying on international private
23
law, the applicable law would govern almost all contractual issues.

CISG, supra note 3, at art. 1(1)(a).
18.
On this distinction between parties that are concerned with legal certainty
19.
and those that are not and its significance, see cases cited infra Part III.
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sale of Goods art. 3,
20.
June 15, 1955, 510 U.N.T.S. 147.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 4.
21.
It has also been stressed that the scope of the Convention, and therefore of
22.
the applicable law, is itself uncertain. See Stephan, supra note 8, at 774-75.
23.
The traditional view is that it would still not govern the transfer of
property or the issue of the capacity of the parties. YVON LoUSSOUARN, PIERRE BOUREL
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The increase of the legal regimes governing the contract is hardly
good for legal certainty, 24 and one could wonder whether such
exclusions of the scope of the harmonization do not impair the utility
25
of the whole process.
Some have challenged whether the rules of the CISG provide the
degree of legal certainty that many commercial parties seek. It has
been noted that its process of negotiation favored the adoption of
vague rules, relying too much on legal standards, which are hardly
good for legal certainty. 26
The Convention was drafted by
representatives of more than fifty states representing all legal
traditions. 27 Although the diversity of the individual drafters must
have complicated the enterprise of negotiating a complete law of
sales, it has been shown that the incentives of the drafters likely led
them to settle on unsatisfactory results in order to reach a final
resolution. 2 The chances are therefore high that the negotiation
resulted in compromises, and in particular, that rules were drafted to
make them acceptable to all. It has been noted that in such cases, the
drafters "had to seek refuge in vague or obfuscatory language," 29 or
would fail to agree on any rule. 30 More generally, scholars have
argued that private legislatures, such as the one set up for the
purpose of drafting the CISG, are bound to reach such unsatisfactory
results and that the frequency of the use of standards by the
31
Convention demonstrates this flaw quite clearly.
Moreover, not only do vague rules not provide precise answers
and thus reduce legal certainty, but if contained in an international
instrument, they are also likely to be interpreted differently by courts
and thus jeopardize the actual harmonization of the field. It must be

& PASCAL DE VAREILLES-SOMMItRES, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt, 395, 561 (2004)

[Fr.] '
24.
See Stephan, supra note 8, at 778 (noting that "[a]dding the CISG increases
legal risk").
25.
Jacob S. Ziegel, The Future of the InternationalSales Convention from a
Common Law Perspective, 6 N.Z. BUS. L. Q. 335, 344 (2000). This argument has been
consistently put forward by leading English lawyers to oppose the United Kingdom's
becoming a Contracting State. See generally Barry Nicholas, The UK and the Vienna
Sales Convention: Another Case of Splendid Isolation?, 9 CENTRO DI STUDI E
RICHERCHE

DI

DIRIrro

COMPARATIVO

E

STRANIERO

(1993),

available

at

http://w3.uniroma1.it/idc/centro/publications/09nicholas.pdf.
26.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 474-75.
27.
Id. at 450; Stanton, supra note 14, at 426.
28.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 461-65; Ziegel, supra note 25, at 338.
29.
Ziegel, supra note 25, at 338; see also Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The
Interpretative Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of 15 Years of CISG
Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 311 (2004); Stephan, supra note 8, at
774.
30.
Ziegel, supra note 25, at 345 (taking the example of Article 78, which fails
to indicate how to determine the interest rate available to the successful party).
31.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 469.
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emphasized that, as an international convention, the CISG cannot be
authoritatively interpreted by a single superior court: the courts of all
Contracting States interpret its provisions, but none of these
interpretations is final and binding on other courts. 3 2 Given the
language differences and the likelihood that courts will interpret the
lenses,
their
domestic
provisions
through
Convention
notwithstanding that Article 7 of the Convention calls for an
interpretation taking into account the international character of the
instrument, the chances are high that diverging interpretations will
arise. 33 Issues requiring interpretation are therefore likely to remain
unsettled and the meaning of the provisions of the Convention
uncertain. As a result, it appears that the legal regime governing the
contract is less certain when34the CISG applies rather than the laws of
the most developed nations.
The common statement that the CISG has improved legal
certainty is an allegation which requires far more evidence than what
its supporters usually provide. This benefit of the CISG is, at the
least, questionable.
B. Law Reform
A few writers claim that international trade requires specific
rules, and they seem to argue that the CISG has provided them. 35
Yet they do not provide any explanation as to why domestic rules
would be unfit in an international context and how the CISG has
provided more appropriate rules in this respect. Professor Ziegel has
submitted that some countries may lack a credible domestic sales
law, but that local parties would still be unwilling to submit their
contracts to the law of the other party. 36 The CISG may therefore be

32.
Id. at 472-73.
33.
For examples of U.S. courts' interpreting the Convention through their
domestic lens and thus providing a distorted image, see generally John E. Murray, The

Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365 (1998).
34.
Some scholars acknowledge that no absolute uniformity will be reached but
that the CISG will at least "tend to reduce differences and to eliminate uncertainty."
LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 11 (2005) (citing Johan Steyn,
A Kind of Esperanto?, in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 14-15 (Peter Birks ed., 1994)).
Yet they still argue that "the benchmark of relative or useful uniformity is superior to
the previous system of private international law characterised by a full panoply of
different domestic laws and systems." Id.
35.
ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 16, at 1; see also BIANCA & BONELL,
supra note 6, at 3-20.
36.
Professor Ziegel takes the examples of Russia and China. Ziegel, supra
note 25, at 342. As for China, see Donald L. Grace, Force Majeure, China & the CISG:
Is China's New Contract Law a Step in the Right Direction?,2 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 173,

199 (2001) (arguing that the adoption of the CISG in China would increase legal
certainty).
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the only option allowing parties from such countries to submit their
contract to their laws and for the contracting parties to benefit from
an at least acceptable legal regime. For those countries, the adoption
of the CISG has the clear consequence of offering commercial parties
a developed body of rules which may be unquestionably superior to
domestic law.
It has also been suggested that the process could have been
generally an occasion for sale law reform. 37 Yet, it is much less clear
that the CISG is superior to the laws of sales of the states that
already had a developed domestic sales law. To begin with, the
drafters of the Convention have clearly borrowed numerous, if not
most, solutions from the existing national laws of the various legal
traditions. It follows that if the CISG could be a better set of rules as
a whole, it can hardly be argued that each of its provisions, taken
separately, lays down a better rule. At best, the Convention could
improve the law of those countries that had a different rule that one
could clearly regard as inferior to the rule retained by the drafters of
the CISG. Yet one should not forget that the mere fact that one rule
was preferred by the drafters over another does not necessarily mean
that the chosen rule was clearly superior to the other. Assessing the
superiority of a rule is far from an objective exercise. Experts could
disagree on the quality of a given rule, not least because they could
assess it on very different grounds. 38 Furthermore, the rule could
have been retained by the drafters for other reasons than its intrinsic
quality, such as the fact that the rule was the only rule acceptable to
the drafters. Indeed, it is again the process of drafting the Convention
that casts doubts on the ability of the Convention to stand as a model
sales law generally. As already stated, the appreciation of the
desirability of a given rule was made by individual drafters from a
variety of backgrounds. 39 As a consequence, it has been frequently
noticed and is hardly surprising that many rules adopted by the
drafters were the result of compromises. 40 A rule could be accepted
by one sub-group of drafters in exchange for inclusion of another one
preferred by another sub-group. Even if an agreement could be
reached as to which rule was the best one in each instance, it could
very well be that the drafters would settle on two acceptable rules
that they would not necessarily regard as being separately the two
best rules. Furthermore, as previously noted, another way to reach a

37.
Stephan, supra note 8, at 748.
38.
For instance, an efficiency analysis could lead to a different result than a
more traditional analysis. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 460 (noting the
different principles favored by developed countries in contrast to developed countries
and nations with planned economies in contrast to those with market economies).

39.
40.

See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See id.
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compromise is to draft a vague provision that can be read in different
ways.41
Although the adoption of the CISG may have been perceived
even in developed countries as an improvement to the pre-existing
law, 42 it cannot be claimed that the enterprise has led to a significant
improvement of sales law.
C. Reduction of Transaction Costs
Finally, for law and economics scholars, the purpose of
harmonizing commercial law ought to be to reduce the transaction
costs of the parties. Contracting in an international context generally
is regarded as more costly than contracting domestically. Because the
parties come from different legal backgrounds, it generally is
assumed that concluding a contract will be more complicated in the
international arena than at home. They will face the specific issue of
43
the applicable law to the contract and will have to address it.
Parties will typically agree on the application of the law of one of
their home countries, and the other party will therefore need to learn
the applicable legal regime, thus incurring a learning effect. 44 Thus,
international sale law seems to save transaction costs for two
reasons. First, the issue of the applicable law disappears, as the law
is the same in the countries of each of the parties. There is therefore
no need to determine which one will apply, thereby saving the parties
the transaction costs of bargaining over the applicable law. Second,
the applicable law is not foreign to any of the parties. As a
consequence, none of them needs to learn it.
It is submitted, however, that the effect of international sale law
on the transaction costs of commercial parties depends on their

41.

See id.

42.
For instance, it seems clear that the French Supreme Court has perceived
Article 49-1 of the CISG (declaration of avoidance of the contract in case of
fundamental breach) as a better rule than the rule in Article 1184 of the Civil Code
(declaration must be judicial), since it subsequently adopted the rule for the purposes
of French domestic law. See Cour de cassation [the highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction] Oct. 13, 1998, D. 1999, 197, obs. Jamin (Fr.). Leading English commercial
scholars also believe that the CISG is better than English law on numerous grounds.
See Roy Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the UK in the Harmonization of
Commercial Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 751, 753 (2001) (taking the example of the

rule that risk passes with control).
43.
Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the 'Private' Back into Private
International Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELBOURNE

U. L. REV. 515, 531 (1997) (Austl.).
44.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 447. Some scholars also refer to these
costs as "information costs." Larry Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis
of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996).
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degree of legal sophistication, which therefore may be a key factor in
assessing the usefulness of harmonization of contract law.
1.

Unsophisticated Parties

The costs of negotiating the law governing an international
contract depend to a great extent on the importance that the parties
attach to the issue and their awareness of the consequences of the
choice of the applicable law.
Unsophisticated parties may be unaware of the importance of
the governing legal regime of the contract. They may feel that what
really is essential is to agree on the substantive issues of their
agreement and that the choice of law clause, just as the jurisdiction
clause, will only be material if a dispute arises, which they do not
really consider at that stage of their relationship. They will typically
regard the law solely as a tool for resolving disputes. They will not
appreciate that the law could void some other contractual provisions
and that they could use the default rules provided by the applicable
law and save the costs of negotiating contractual provisions to the
same effect. As a consequence, unsophisticated parties often negotiate
without lawyers because they feel that they do not need lawyers for
negotiating substantive contractual obligations. In these kinds of
cases, the parties will typically put most of their efforts into
negotiating substantive clauses and then negotiate the jurisdiction
and choice of law clauses in haste, as formal legal ornaments. The
limited time for the negotiation will typically have almost expired, a
long negotiation on the substantive obligations will often have been
exhausting, and these parties will not have the patience to put
substantial efforts into a discussion involving issues perceived as
minor. Indeed, with the parties often unaware of the consequences of
such choices, they will not clearly appreciate their interest and will
not see what they should be trying to obtain in the negotiation.
Typically, they will therefore either try to seek an agreement on the
law of their country of origin or, if they cannot reach such agreement,
try to settle on a "neutral" provision: that the law governing the
contract be the law of a third party, i.e., the law of a state that is not
the state of origin of any of the parties. In an effort for consistency,
the parties may also grant jurisdiction to the courts of the third state
or, alternatively, to arbitrators sitting in the territory of the third
45
state.

45.
Given the very remote link between the seat of the arbitration and the
applicable law in modern international arbitration, this last consistency will generally
be illusory.

2006]

IS THE CISG BENEFITINGANYBODY?

For such parties, the costs of international contracting will not
be significantly higher than the costs of contracting in a domestic
context. The parties will not feel the need to invest time and effort in
learning the content of the applicable law, whether foreign or not. In
whichever context, they will simply incur no learning effect. The only
additional transaction cost will be the negotiation of the choice of law
clause. However, the parties therefore will put very limited effort in
the negotiation of such clause.
This approach to the choice of the law governing the contract is
obviously very dangerous. The law chosen by the parties will contain
mandatory rules. If some of the contractual provisions contradict
some of these rules, they will not be enforceable. The law could even
provide that the contract is wholly invalid and allow any of the
parties having an interest in doing so to have it set aside. Ex post, the
parties may thus incur high costs if the negotiated provisions prove
unenforceable. However, these costs will only be incurred if a dispute
arises and if the parties are unable to settle on a business basis. The
unenforceability of a clause or even of the whole contract will be
irrelevant if one of the parties has not attempted to take advantage of
it either in negotiation or judicial proceedings. The costs will then be
a function of the probability of a dispute and one party's reliance on
the unenforceability of the clause. They will not necessarily be higher
than the transaction costs that the parties will have saved, whether
consciously or not, by neglecting the issue of the applicable law.
These costs will not necessarily be higher in an international
context than in a domestic context. There is no reason to believe that
the probability of a dispute arising would be higher in an
international context. The real issue would be whether the
probability of the infringement of a mandatory rule would arise. Even
if a party does not want to make the effort of ensuring that the
contract is legally enforceable, it is likely that a party negotiating a
domestic contract would reproduce many of the clauses commonly
used in the industry. The probability of such clauses being invalid or
unenforceable would thus be lower than for any atypical clause,
because other parties in the industry would have hired lawyers or
experienced litigation because of these clauses and learned from their
experiences. On the other hand, if a foreign law governs the contract,
the parties' practices cease to increase the probability of validity of
the contract. Thus, if the parties agree on the domestic law of a third
party state, it is likely that the probability of the invalidity of the
contract increases and thus adds to the costs of international
contracting. However, if the applicable law is the law of origin of one
of the parties and governs its domestic transactions, the practices of
that party remain relevant, at least to the extent that the
international negotiation will not result in a compromise and thus in
a change of his practices.
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It also seems inefficient for the parties not to have determined
whether the applicable law contained default rules that were
acceptable to them and maybe the same as the provisions that they
eventually agreed upon. However, the transaction costs of negotiating
these provisions where equivalent or acceptable defaults existed in
the applicable legislation could only be saved by incurring a learning
effect and establishing the content of the applicable law. Again,
whether this learning effect is lower than the unnecessary
transaction costs incurred by the parties is unclear.
2.

Sophisticated Parties

Sophisticated parties will be aware of the importance of the legal
regime governing the contract. They will know that the applicable
law may prohibit the parties' agreement on certain contractual
provisions and could go as far as making the whole contract void. It
could also be argued that they would know that the quality of the
default rules of the governing law will have an effect on the scope of
the parties' negotiation and thus bear on their transaction costs.
The Influence of Mandatory Rules on the Costs of International
Contracting
Sophisticated parties would not conclude contracts unless
ensured that they are valid and enforceable. This is not to say,
however, that they would necessarily want their lawyers to be
involved in the negotiation. In some industries, parties will conclude
similar contracts on a regular basis. They will typically know the
rules applicable to the clauses that they commonly use or at least
know that these common clauses are legally acceptable. The
transaction costs of concluding a domestic contract will include no
additional learning effect. In some other industries, however, parties
will conclude contracts tailored to the underlying commercial
operation. Typically, the parties will conclude fewer deals, but the
value at stake in each deal will be much higher. The intervention of
lawyers will then appear both as more necessary and more affordable
because of both the novelty of potential specific legal issues that the
contract could raise and the value of the deal. Typically, the parties
will then seek the advice of their lawyers for each deal because they
will not assume that the advice for one given deal will apply to
another deal. In other words, the parties will always ask their lawyer
to assure them that the contractual provisions that they have
negotiated are valid and enforceable.
This difference will entail a very different approach to
international contracts and to the possibility of a foreign law
governing the contract. For those parties who could not consider
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concluding a contract without seeking the advice of their lawyers, the
international character of the contract will only marginally increase
transaction costs. They will obviously need to bargain over a new
issue, the applicable law. 46 However, no additional learning effect will
be incurred, since they will seek the advice of their lawyers in any
circumstances. Whether their lawyers will assure them that the
contract is valid and enforceable under domestic law or a foreign law
is essentially irrelevant. Often they will not even need to change
lawyers since the law firm they usually use at home will typically
have an office in the country the law of which was chosen to govern
the contract.
The situation will be very different for the parties who would
usually not seek the advice of their lawyers before concluding a
domestic contract. If a foreign law or an unfamiliar legal regime
governs the contract, they cannot rely on their prior knowledge of the
law anymore and must learn the applicable law, thus incurring a
learning effect. Practically, these parties will have to seek the advice
of a lawyer and ask him how best to use the applicable law. This cost
will be incurred by one of the parties only if the applicable law is the
law of the other party's home country. It will be incurred by each of
the parties and thus doubled if the applicable law is the law of a third
party state and thus unfamiliar to both of them.
The learning effect will thus be an additional transaction cost for
the conclusion of an international contract in only some
circumstances. However, it must be stressed that the choice of the
applicable law will command other contractual choices, which may
entail further costs for one of the parties. For instance, parties may
wish to ensure that the applicable law would be applied by an
adjudicator who is familiar with that law. 4 7 If a court applies a law
with which it is not familiar, it may misinterpret it. Indeed, the law
would be foreign to the court and thus would have to be established
before it. The applicable law would then become the law, the content
of which could be proven to the satisfaction of the court. In many
cases, the law would be distorted, and in the worst scenario, the court
could find that the content of the applicable law was not proven to its
satisfaction and declare its own law applicable. 48 To avoid the costs

46.
The parties could come from a non-unified legal system and thus face this
issue even for domestic contracts. This is the case of U.S. parties that already evolve in
a pluralistic legal environment. For them, this first additional cost of international
contracting would be nonexistent unless the pluralistic environment was erased by a
far reaching harmonization.
47.
In the context of unification of European contract law, see Gerhard Wagner,
The Economics of Harmonization:The Case of Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV.

995, 1010-11 (2002).
48.
In most jurisdictions, the law of the forum will be applied as a substitute if
the content of the foreign applicable law cannot be established to the satisfaction of the
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of the process of establishing the content of foreign law during a
trial 4 9 and the costs of having a less predictable legal regime
governing the contract, the parties should therefore grant jurisdiction
to the courts of the state of the law which governs the contract. The
consequence of this choice will be that one party will bear the
potential costs of litigating abroad, which could be higher than the
costs of litigating at home. The most obvious reason for the increase
in costs would be the language used in the litigation, which would
typically be foreign. All legal documents produced by a party's
lawyers would have to be translated. If the law of evidence of the local
court demands that witnesses be heard, the costs of having these
witnesses travel to testify would also increase. It follows that, if some
parties do not incur further learning effects by accepting that a
foreign law governs the contract, their litigation costs could be
increased as a consequence of the choice of law.
The litigation costs could also be generally higher in one given
jurisdiction. Lawyers could charge much more for the same service.
Anglo-Saxon lawyers notoriously charge higher hourly rates than
most civil lawyers. The local law could require the parties to hire
several lawyers when they would only hire one in other countries. In
the United Kingdom, the parties must retain a solicitor and a
barrister. 50 Local procedure could rely on very costly pre-trial
procedures such as discovery. The trial could last much longer,
because local civil procedure could be oral and rely heavily on oral
testimony. Lawyers would then charge more because they would
provide more services. A jurisdiction clause, whether commanded or
not by a choice of law clause, could have a significant effect on the
potential litigation costs, not only of the party litigating abroad, but
of both parties.
In an international context, the parties will generally be able to
choose the law governing their contract. 51 From an efficiency

court.

DIcEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 221 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds.,

13th ed. 2000) (U.K.); PIERRE MAYER & VINCENT HEUZ9, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9
144 (2004)

(Fr.);

JAN KROPHOLLER,

INTERNATIONALES

PRIVATSRECHT

38

(1994)

(F.R.G.).
49.
Typically, each of the parties would have to retain an expert in the
applicable law to prove the content of that law to the satisfaction of the court. They
would also have to pay increased litigation costs since an additional issue would have
to be litigated.
50.

See generally KONRAD

ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO

COMPARATIVE LAW 92, 103 (1992).
51.
The scope of the freedom of the parties, however, varies from one
jurisdiction to another. In most jurisdictions, the parties may choose any law, even
wholly unconnected to the contract. This is the case in the European conflict of laws.
Convention on the Applicable Law to Contractual Obligations art. 3, June 19, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 1492 (1980). In some other jurisdictions, the law must be connected to the
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perspective, the choice of law rule will enable them to make the less
costly choice and to bargain over it. The parties should obviously try
to choose the applicable law that would most reduce the costs
incurred equally by both of them. But they should also try to reduce
as much as possible the costs incurred by one of them only, because
that party would accept to bear a cost only if this loss is reflected in
the share of the surplus that that party would receive from the
bargain. Reducing the costs of one party would still increase the
overall surplus of the transaction and eventually the share that each
party would receive.
For parties for whom the learning effect is an additional cost, a
choice can and should be made in favor of the law of origin of one
party to keep the learning effect as low as possible. A party with a
learning effect would clearly have a disadvantage since it would bear
a transaction cost alone, but the deal could take that into account by
increasing the share of surplus that party would receive from the
bargain. If the parties are aware that the cost can be taken into
account in the general equilibrium of the deal, they should not prefer
the application of one law over the other but should only ensure that
whatever the applicable law, the contract is valid, and its provisions
are enforceable.
However, the choice of one law over the other could be
commanded by the common loss that both parties would suffer by
litigating in one jurisdiction and not the other. If litigation is
significantly more costly in one of the two countries of origin of the
parties, the only efficient solution seems to be to reach an agreement
on the application of the law and the jurisdiction of the courts of the
less expensive country and to increase the share of the surplus of the
party that consents to learn a foreign law and potentially litigate
abroad. Such an agreement would obviously depend upon the
cheapest jurisdiction appearing as reasonably fair to foreign parties.
Otherwise, unless the other party is ready to accept an even smaller
share of the surplus and in effect provide insurance to the party that
accepts potential litigation in an unfriendly forum, the parties would
have no other choice than to litigate in the more expensive forum or
to resort to international arbitration.
The opportunity to choose the applicable law may also be
regarded by some parties as a chance to avoid inefficient mandatory
rules of their law of origin by choosing a more efficient foreign law to
govern their contract. 5 2 A party that had renounced the opportunity

contract. This has traditionally been the case in the United States. See U.C.C. § 1105(1) (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).

52.
Larry Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37
GA. L. REV. 363, 390 (2003) [hereinafter Ribstein, From Efficiency]; Larry Ribstein,
Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 248 (1993).
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to benefit from a given contractual clause because it is void under its
law of origin could agree on the application of a foreign law under
which the clause would be valid. For one of the parties at least,
international contracting would thus reveal itself to be beneficial.

The Influence of Default Rules on the Costs of International
Contracting
The applicable law is also important because it provides default
rules. Default rules apply when the parties were free to agree on a
provision governing their relationship but did not do so. These rules
will fill the gaps of the incomplete contract that the parties will
almost necessarily conclude. Modern contract scholarship claims that
default rules would have an influence on the transaction costs of the
parties in two ways: if the default rules are favored by the parties,
they would allow the parties to negotiate less; if they are disfavored
by the parties, they would force them to negotiate more.

Default Rules Favored by the Parties
If the parties would have negotiated and drafted a contractual
clause having the same effect as the applicable default rule, they
could avoid negotiating and drafting the clause and thus save the
transaction costs of so doing. The parties would waste time and effort
if they were to agree on contractual provisions that would be the
same as the default rules of the law governing their agreement. The
costs arising out of the negotiation of such clauses would also be
wasted, since without the negotiation, the substantive obligations of
the parties would have been the same. It follows that the transaction
costs of concluding a contract could vary depending on the quality of
the default rules of the applicable law. The more the applicable law
contained default rules that the parties would actually have
53
negotiated, the shorter, and thus cheaper, could be the negotiation.
In the international context, there would therefore be a case for
taking into account the quality of the default rules of the potential
applicable laws in the choice of law process. The parties would
include this factor into their assessment of the costs of preferring one
54
law over the other.

53.
See Ribstein, From Efficiency, supra note 52, at 399; Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541,
596 (2003).
54.
Francesco Parisi & Larry Ribstein, Choice of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 236, 237 (1998); Whincop & Keyes, supra
note 43, at 531 (1997).
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It is submitted, however, that good default rules of the applicable
law do not save transaction costs. 5 5 First, the parties cannot assess
whether a default rule is good for their purposes before knowing
which contractual provision they would prefer. To determine whether
they could save costs by avoiding negotiation of a given clause
because the applicable default rule is the same, the parties need to
determine the obligation that they would prefer, i.e. the content of the
clause. Once the content of the preferred clause has been determined,
most of the transaction costs have been incurred. Although the
clause may not actually be drafted, it has been negotiated. At that
stage, the parties could certainly realize that the default rule is
actually the same, but whether they would decide to use it or to draft
a contractual provision would have no material effect on the
transaction costs of negotiating the clause.
The only way that default rules could save costs would be to take
them into account at an early stage of the negotiation. For instance,
the parties could, on each issue, wonder what the applicable default
rule provides and determine whether they would like to keep it or to
contract out of it. It does not seem very realistic to expect the parties
to conduct a negotiation in that way since their main goal is to reach
an agreement on business terms. In most negotiations, the parties
come with an idea of the core substantive obligations that they would
like to see in the contract and then bargain over them from a business
standpoint. The parties would certainly be happy to incur lower
transaction costs, but this is a minor concern at the time of the
negotiation.
It should also be stressed that for commercial parties, there may
be an important difference between an express contractual provision
and a default rule in the applicable law. Psychologically, the
obligation will appear as more binding and clearer if it is an express
clause in the contract rather than a default rule that usually only
lawyers are usually able to locate. An express obligation in a contract
will always appear as more clearly applicable than any default rule.
Default Rules Disfavored by the Parties
If the parties initially intended to negotiate a contractual
provision on a given issue, the disfavor for the applicable default rule
does not bear on their transaction costs. However, if they did not so
intend, they will need to negotiate a different contractual provision
and thus incur additional costs for opting out of the default rule. If
default rules are so different from what the parties would have

55.
The author is currently working on a paper which explores this idea in
further detail.
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negotiated that they would be unacceptable to them, the parties may
56
be forced to negotiate more in order to contract out of such rules.
Initially, the parties may not have intended to address the issue in
their negotiation, but after being informed of the content of the
disfavored rule by their lawyers who reviewed the contract, the
parties thus decided to contract around it. Default rules could be
disfavored by the parties for various reasons. Lawmakers could
simply have failed to make rules that most parties would favor. Or
they could have provided a good default rule for most parties that
would not be favored by specific parties. Finally, lawmakers could
have made a bad default rule or penalty default rule on purpose to
incite the parties to contract around it or address a given issue with a
57
contractual clause.
These kinds of default rules would undoubtedly increase the
transaction costs of the parties. The more the applicable law contains
unfavorable default rules, the more costly the conclusion of the
contract would be. It could therefore be argued that parties to an
international contract could enter into a process of comparison of the
various potentially applicable laws and assess the quality of their
default rules. Such a comparison would further increase transaction
costs for the parties, but those costs would be worth incurring if the
parties do not want to take the risk of opting out of a disfavored rule
in haste and if the parties understand that it would be safer to rely on
an acceptable default rule of another legal system. It has been
stressed that default rules are often the result of years of experience
of the lawyers of a given legal system, and that they have been tested
in a multitude of situations and cases.58 The reasonable option for
the parties is therefore to incur either the costs of a full negotiation to
determine the most acceptable rule to both parties or the costs of a
59
comparison between a few laws practically available to the parties.
That comparison would be aimed at finding rules that simply could be
acceptable to both parties but more reliable than provisions agreed
upon in haste. The possibility of choosing between several laws could
therefore benefit the parties if the laws are not comparable on the
issues at stake.

56.
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 261, 276 (1985).
57.
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
58.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 56, at 277.
59.
That is, arguably, the law of origin of each party so that one only would
incur a learning effect.
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III.

THE STUDY OF

181

CASES WHERE THE

CISG

WAS APPLIED

To assess the effect of the CISG on the contractual practices of
commercial parties involved in international trade and to find
whether it has been beneficial to them, this Article will utilize data
on contractual practices since the CISG has been governing
international sales of goods. The most accessible data are the cases
where the CISG was applied, especially the cases applying the CISG
in three major jurisdictions: the United States, Germany, and France.
This Article also explores the arbitral awards that were made
available to the public, particularly those by the International
Chamber of Commerce. In total, the data provides evidence of the
contractual practices adopted in 181 cases.
The most important information that the study reveals is that
parties to international sales are generally not concerned with the
legal regime governing their contracts. The study of judgments
rendered by U.S. courts show that in twenty-four out of thirty-eight
cases, parties did not even provide for the law governing their
contracts, let alone opt in or out of the CISG,60 and in two other cases

60.
The parties included no choice of law clause in twenty-four cases. Chateau
des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA, Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 528-31 (9th Cir. 2003);
Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots OY, 333 F.3d 440, 442-43 (3d Cir. 2003);
Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., 37 F. App'x 687, 687-91 (4th Cir.
2002); Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 387
(7th Cir. 2002); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, S.P.A.,
144 F.3d 1384, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1998); Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer
Prods., Inc., No. CV-92-03442-KN(Ex), 1996 WL 473755, at **1 (9th Cir. Aug. 20,
1996); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1995);
Beijing Metals & Minerals Imp./Exp. Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 117981 (5th Cir. 1993); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663-68
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Comercializadora Portimex S.A. de C.V. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corporation,
373 F. Supp. 2d 645, 646-48 (E.D. La. 2005); McDowell Valley Vineyards, Inc. v.
Sabate USA Inc,, No. C-04-0708, 2005 WL 2893848, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2005);
Amco Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683-85 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Chi.
Prime Packers v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704-08 (N.D. Ill.
2004); Raw Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GMBH & Co., KG, No. 03-C-1154,
2004 WL 1535839, at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 7, 2004); Chi. Prime Packers v. Northam
Food Trading Co., No. 01-C-4447, 2003 WL 21254261, at *1-*3 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2003);
Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241-44 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., 9 F. Supp. 2d 880, 881-83 (N.D. Ill.
2002); Shuttle Packaging Sys. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 WL 34046276, at "1*2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001); Supermicro Computer, Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L.,
No. CIV.A. 99-6384, 2000 WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000); Fercus, S.R.L. v.
Palazzo, No. 98 CIV. 7728(NRB), 2000 WL 1118925, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000);
Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, at *1*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998); Mitchell Aircraft Spares v. European Aircraft Serv. AB, 23
F. Supp. 2d 915, 916-18 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789
F.Supp. 1229, 1230-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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the parties had sent standardized forms or unilaterally provided for
the applicable law without seeking the agreement of the other party
on the issue. 61 In others words, in twenty-four out of thirty-eight
cases, or 63%, the parties were not sufficiently concerned with the
applicable law to include a provision in this respect or to ensure that
it would be enforceable. The CISG was therefore held applicable
under Article 1.1(a), i.e., because the places of business of the parties
62
were in different Contracting States.
This information is confirmed by a study of the cases tried by
German and French courts. In Germany, the jurisdiction in which the
most cases applying the CISG can be found, the parties provided for
the applicable law in only seven cases. 63 In one case, a German court

The parties included a choice of law clause in fourteen cases. BP Oil Int'l Ltd. v.
Empresa Estatal Petoleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 2003); Multi-Juice,
S.A. v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4635(RPP), 2006 WL 1519981, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006); Beltappo Inc. v. Rich Xiberta, S.A., No. C05-1343Z, 2006 WL
314338, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2006); Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine
Specialties, No. C.A. 05-321-T, 2006 WL 225778, at *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 30, 2006); Fisher v.
Thyssen Mannesmann Handel GMBH, No. 05 C 6193. 2006 WL 211858, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 19, 2006); Am. Mint LLC v. GO Software, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-650, 2005 WL
2021248, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2005); Genpharm v. Pliva-Lachema A.S., 361 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg., No. 01 C 5938,
2003 WL 223187, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2003); Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int'l. Mktg.
Strategies, 255 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (W.D. Mich. 2003); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v.
Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Hull 753 Corp. v. Elbe Flugzeugwerke GMBH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 925,
927 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Northland Power v. Gen. Elec., 105 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (S.D. Ohio
1999); Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., No. 95 CIV. 10506(DLC)., 1997
WL 458785, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
61.
Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy & Greeni Trading Oy, 373 F. Supp.
2d 475, 477 (D.N.J. 2005); Magellan Int'l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp.
2d 919, 920-21 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
62.
See CISG, supra note 3, at art. 1(1)(a).
63.
Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf [OLG] [Diusseldorf Court of Appeals] Apr. 21,
2004, No. 1-15 U 88/03, slip op. at 4, 5 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/
overview.php?test=915; Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf [OLG] [Duisseldorf Court of
Appeals] Jan. 23, 2004, No. 1-17 U 110/02, slip op. at 5 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=918;
Oberlandesgericht
Zweibriicken
[OLGI
[Zweibriicken Court of Appeals] July 26, 2002, 2/2002 Internationales Handelsrecht
[IHR] 67 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg.online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=688;
Oberlandesgericht Rostock [OLG] [Rostock Court of Appeals] Oct. 10, 2001, No. 6 U
126/00,
slip op.
(F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=671;
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG] [Frankfurt Court of Appeals] Aug. 30, 2000, 2001
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 383 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=594; Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG] [Hamburg
Court of Appeals] Jan. 26, 2000, 2000 Rechtsprechung des Hanseatischen
Oberlandesgerichts Hamburg [OLGR Hamburg] 464 (F.R.G.), available at http://cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=509; Landgericht -[LG] [Bielefeld Trial Court] Dec 12,
2003, No. 15 0 50/03, slip op. at 5 (F.R.G.), http://cisg.online.chlcisg/overview.
php?test=905.
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found that the parties had implicitly done so but that their contract
certainly did not contain an express choice of law clause.64 In twentyfive cases, German courts expressly noted that the parties had not
provided for the applicable law. 65 Finally, in thirty-eight cases,

64.
Oberlandesgericht K6ln [OLGI [K6ln Court of Appeals] May 28, 2001,
1/2002 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 21 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=681.
65.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr 30, 2003, No. III
ZR 237/02, slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=790;
Bundesgerichtshog [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct 2, 2002, 1/2003
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 28 (F.R.G), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=700; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] Jan. 9, 2002, 1/2002 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 16 (F.R.G.), available
at
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=714
(battle
of
forms);
Oberlandesgericht K6ln [OLG] [Kbln Court of Appeals] Feb. 13, 2006, No. 16 U 17/05,
slip op.
at
3 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=1219;
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [OLG] [Stuttgart Court of Appeals] Dec. 20, 2004, No. 5 U
108/04, slip op. at 5 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=997;
Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf [OLG] [Duisseldorf Court of Appeals] July 22, 2004, Np.
1-6 U 210/03, slip op. at 3 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?
test=916; Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf [OLG] [Duisseldorf Court of Appeals] May 28,
2004, 2004 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 203 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=850;
Oberlandesgericht Dfdsseldorf
[OLG] [DUsseldorf Court of Appeals] Apr. 21, 2004, No. 1-15 U 30/03, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-onlne.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=913; Oberlandesgericht Zweibriicken
[OLG] [Zweibricken Court of Appeals] Feb. 2, 2004, No. 7 U 4/03, slip op. at 7 (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=877;
Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf
[OLG] [DUsseldorf Court of Appeals] Jan. 30, 2004, 2004 Internationales Handelsrecht
[IHR] 108 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=821;
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG] [Karlsruhe Court of Appeals] Dec. 10, 2003, 2004
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 262 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=91 1; Oberlandesgericht Duisseldorf [OLG] [DUsseldorf
Court of Appeals] July 25, 2003, No. 1-23 U 70/03, slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overivew.php?test=821;
Landgericht
Neubrandenburg
[LG]
[Neubrandenburg Trial Court] Aug. 3, 2005, 2006 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR]
26 (F.R.G), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=ll90 (battle
of forms); Landgericht M6nchengladbach [LG] [Mnchengladbach Trial Court] July 15,
2003, 5/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 229 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=813;
Landgericht Tibingen [LG]
[Tilbingen Trial Court] June 18, 2003, 5/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 236
(F.R.G.),
available
at
http://www.cisg-online.chcisg/overview.php?test=784;
Landgericht Saarbriicken [LG] [Saarbrticken Dist. Ct.] Nov. 25, 2002, 2/2003
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 70
(F.R.G), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=718; Landgericht Braunschweig [LG] [Braunschweig
Trial Court] July 30, 2001, 2/2002 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 71 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.cisg-online.cbcisg/overview.php?test=689; Landgericht Trier
[LG] [Trier Trial Court] June 28, 2001, No. 7 HKO 204/99, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=673; Landgericht Trier [LG] [Trier
Trial Court] Mar. 29, 2001, No. 7 HKO 204/9, slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=674; Landgericht Mfinchen [LG] [Minchen Trial
Court] Nov. 16, 2000, No. 12 HKO 3804/00, slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisgonline.ch./cisg/overview.php?test=667; Landgericht Stendal [LG] [Stendal Trial Court]
Oct. 12, 2000, 2001 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 34 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=592; Landgericht Memmingen [LG]
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German courts held that the CISG applied because the parties had
their places of business in different Contracting States without
actually mentioning whether the contract contained a choice of law
clause. 66 Thus, in more than 75% of the cases that discussed the
[Memmingen Trial Court] Sept. 13, 2000, No. 2H 0 382/99, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=820; Landgericht Darmstadt [LG]
[Darmstadt Trial Court] May 9, 2000, 2001 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 27
(F.R.G.),
available
at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=560;
Landgericht Munchen [LG] [Miinchen Trial Court] Apr. 6, 2000, No. 12 HKO 4174/99,
slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview/php?test=665; Amstgericht
Duisburg [AG] [Duisburg Local Court] Apr. 13, 2000, No. 49 C 502/00, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.chl cisg/overivew.php?test=659.
66.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 11, 2006, 2/2006
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 82 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=1200; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] June 30, 2004, 2004 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 788 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=847; Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 31, 2001, No. VIII ZR 60/01, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=617; Oberlandesgericht Koln [OLG]
[Koln Court of Appeals] May 24, 2006, No. 16 W 25/06, slip op. at 4 (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=1232; Oberlandesgericht Koln [OLG]
[Koln Court of Appeals] Apr. 3, 2006, No. 16 U 65/05, slip op. at 3 (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=1218; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe
[OLG] [Karlsruhe Court of Appeals] July 20, 2004, 2004 Internationales Handelsrecht
[IHR] 246 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=858;
Oberlandesgericht Celle [OLG] [Celle Court of Appeals] Mar. 10, 2004, 2004
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 106 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=824; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG] [Frankfurt
Court of Appeals] Jan. 29, 2004, 2004 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 113 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=822; Oberlandesgericht
Rostock [OLG] [Rostock Court of Appeals] Oct. 27, 2003, No. 3 U 205/02, slip op.
(F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=815;
Oberlandesgericht
Miinchen [OLG] [Muinchen Court of Appeals] Nov. 13, 2002, No. 27 U 346/02, slip op.
(F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=786;
Oberlandesgericht
Schleswig-Holstein [OLG] [Schleswig-Holstein Court of Appeals] Oct. 29, 2002, 2/2003
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 67 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=717; Oberlandesgericht Koln [OLG] [Kbln Court of
Appeals] Oct. 14, 2002, 2/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 15 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=709; Oberlandesgericht
Koblenz [OLG] [Koblenz Court of Appeals] Oct. 4, 2002, 2/2003 Internationales
Handelsrecht
[IHR]
66
(F.R.G.),
available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/
cisg/overview.php?test=716; Oberlandesgericht Rostock [OLG] [Rostock Court of
Appeals] Sept. 25, 2002, 1/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 19 (F.R.G.),
available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=672; Oberlandesgericht
Schleswig-Holstein [OLG] [Schleswig.Holstein Court of Appeals] Aug. 22, 2002, 1/2003
Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 20 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=710; Oberlandesgericht MUnchen [OLG] [Mtinchen
Court of Appeals] July 1, 2002, No. 17 U 2513/02, slip op. (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=656; Oberlandesgericht Koln [OLG]
[Koln Court of Appeals] July 16, 2001, No. 16 U 22/01, slip op. (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=609;
Oberlandesgericht
Stuttgart
[OLG] [Stuttgart Court of Appeals] Mar. 12, 2001, No. 5 U 216/99, slip op. at 9 (F.R.G.),
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=841; Oberlandesgericht Zweibriucken
[OLG] [Zweibriucken Court of Appeals] Feb. 14, 2001, 2001 Internationales
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existence of a choice of law clause, the parties did not provide for the
applicable law to their contract of sale.
In France, the forty-one cases which applied the CISG can be
divided along the same lines. If one ignores the seventeen cases
where the court held that the CISG applied without stating whether
the parties had provided for the applicable law, 6 7 a review of the

Handelsrecht [IHR] 64 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/
overview.php?test--610; Oberlandesgericht Koln [OLG] [K6ln Court of Appeals] Nov.
13, 2000, No. 16 U 45/00, slip op. (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?
test=657; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [OLGI [Stuttgart Court of Appeals] Feb. 28,
Handelsrecht [IHR] 65 (F.R.G.), available at
2000, 2001 Internationales
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=583; Landgericht Trier [LG] [Trier
Trial Court] Jan. 8, 2004, 2004 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 115 (F.R.G.),
Landgericht
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=910;
available at
Hamburg [LG] [Hamburg Dist. Ct.] Nov. 26, 2003, No. 411 0 99/02, slip op. at 6
(F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=875; Landgericht Bielefeld
[LG] [Bielefeld Trial Court] Oct. 31, 2003, No.15 0 6/03, slip op. at 5 (F.R.G.),
Landgericht Hamburg [LG]
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=907;
[Hamburg Trial Court] Sept. 10, 2003, No. 411 0 183/02, slip op. at 6 (F.R.G.),
Bielefeld
[LG]
Landgericht
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=874;
[Bielefeld Trial Court] Aug 15, 2003, No. 15 0 5/03, slip op. at 4 (F.R.G.),
Landgericht Nuirnberg-Firth
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=906;
[LG] [Niirnberg-Fiirth Trial Court] Feb. 27, 2003, 1/2004 Internationales Handelsrecht
[JHR] 20 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php? test=818;
Landgericht GieBen [LG] [Giel~en Trial Court] Dec. 17, 2002, 2003 Internationales
[IHR] 276 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/
Handelsrecht
overview.php?test=766; Landgericht G6ttingen [LG] [Gttingen Trial Court] Sept. 20,
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/
(F.R.G.),
0
43/01,
slip op.
No.
7
2002,
overview.php?test=655; Landgericht Freiburg [LG] [Freiburg Trial Court] Aug. 22,
2002, 1/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 22 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.cbcisg/overview.php?test=711; Landgericht Saarbriicken [LG]
[Saarbrilcken Trial Court] July 2, 2002, 1/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 27
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=713 (discussion
of German law in correspondence); Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [Stuttgart Trial Court]
June 4, 2002, No. 15 0 179/01, slip op. at 9 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=909; Landgericht Freiburg [LG] [Freiburg Trial
Court] Apr. 26, 2002, 1/2003 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 72 (F.R.G.), available
at http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=690; Landgericht Miinchen [LG]
[Miinchen Trial Court] Feb. 27, 2002, No. 5HK 0 3936/00, slip op. (F.R.G.),
Landgericht Munchen [LG]
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=654;
[Miinchen Trial Court] Aug. 30, 2001, No. 12 HK 0 5593/01, slip op. (F.R.G.),
Landgericht Darmstadt [LG]
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=668;
[Darmstadt Trial Court] May 29, 2001, 4/2001 Internationales Handelsrecht [IHR] 160
at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=686;
available
(F.R.G.),
Landgericht Hamburg [LG] [Hamburg Dist. Ct.] Jan. 31, 2001, No. 411 0 11/00, slip
op. at 5 (F.R.G.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=876; Amtsgericht
Viechtach [AG] [Viechtach Local Court] Apr. 11, 2002, 2002 Juistisches Biiro [JurBuiro]
429 (F.R.G.), availableat http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=755.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 14e ch., Sept. 19, 2003,
67.
No. 2003/01961, slip op, http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=789; Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., Sept. 10, 2003, No. 2002/02304,
Cour d'appel [CA]
slip op., http://www.cisg-online.clcisg/overview.php?test=788;
[regional court of appeal] Colmar, le ch., Nov. 13, 2002, D. 2003, Somm. 2367, obs.
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twenty-four other judgments of French courts which applied the
CISG reveals that parties seriously addressed the issue of the
applicable law in only one case. 68 In nineteen cases, the contract was
silent as to the applicable law.6 9 In one case, the parties had provided

Witz; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., June 14, 2001, No.
2000/13970, slip op., obs. Witz, http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php? test=693;
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Orl6ans, Mar. 29, 2001, No. 00/02909, slip
op., http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=611; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Oct. 12, 2000, No. 1998/025917, slip op., http://www.cisgonline.chlcisg/overview.php?test=1094; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Rouen, Feb. 17, 2000, available at http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/
170200v.htm; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 21, 1999, D.
2000, Somm.
441, obs.
Witz, available at http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg
overview.php?test=574; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch., May
21, 1999, D. 2000, Somm. 442, obs. Witz, available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=498; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Grenoble, Feb. 4, 1999, D. 1999, Somm. 363, obs. Witz, available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=443; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris,
D,
Mar.
18,
1998,
No.
97/25212,
slip
op.,
http://www.cisg-online.ch
cisg/overview.php?test=533; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, D, Mar.
4, 1998, No. 97/24418, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/ cisg/overview.php?test=535;
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 12e ch., Jan. 29, 1998, No.
1222/95, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=337; Cour d'appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Dec. 13, 1995, JCP [1997] II [22772], note
Vareilles-Sommi~res,
available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?
test=312; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Mar. 29, 1995, No.
93/2821, slip op., note Kahn, http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=156;
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Feb. 22, 1995, No. 93/3275, slip
op., note Kahn, http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=151;
Cour d'appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, June 16, 1993, No. 92/4223, slip op.,
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/ overview.php?test=90.
68.
Cass. com., Dec. 17, 1996, D. 1997, 337, note Remery (Fr.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=220. In another case, the parties had
provided for the applicable law (Minnesota) for a concession, but not for the sales made
under such concession. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, May 15,
1996,
D.
1997,
Somm.
221,
obs.
Witz,
available at http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=219.
69.
Cass. le civ., June 26 2001, Bull. civ. I, No. 187, at 120, (Fr.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=598; Cass. le civ., June 26 2001, Bull.
civ. I, No. 189, at 119, (Fr.), available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?
test=695; Cass. le civ., Dec. 2 1997, Bull. civ. I, No. 336, at 229, (Fr.), available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=294; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Paris, Nov. 4 2004, No. 1994/83479, slip op., http://www.cisgonline.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=1008; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Poitiers, le ch., Oct. 26 2004, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/ cisg/overview.php?
test=952; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 25e ch., June 4, 2004, No.
2002/18702, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.cb/cisg/overview.php?test=872;
Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, Dec. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.cisg-online.chlcisg/overview.php?test=871; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Grenoble Nov. 28, 2002, JCP 2003, ed. G, IV 1215, available at
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=787; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Versailles, June 27 2002, available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?pid=l&do=case&id=848&step=FullText; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, Nov. 6 2001, D. 2002, 2795, available at http://www.cisg-
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for the application of their law of origin on their commercial forms
but did not bother to ensure that the provision would be
enforceable. 70 Finally, in one case the parties sporadically mentioned
articles of the Italian civil code, which led the court to hold that they
had implicitly chosen Italian law. 7 ' Thus, in more than 95% of these
cases, the parties do not seem to have been concerned with the legal
regime governing their transaction.
Finally, a study of thirty arbitral awards which applied the
CISG, including twenty-five awards of arbitral tribunals constituted
under the aegis of the International Chamber of Commerce, reveals
that the parties had provided for the applicable law in only twelve
cases. 72
In seventeen cases, their contracts were silent in this
respect. 73 In one case, the parties were deemed to have chosen the

online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=677; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Colmar, June 12, 2001, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=694;
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Amiens, Jan. 30, 2001, D. 2002, Somm.
323; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Feb. 10, 1999, D., No.
1996/82223, available at http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/100299v.htm; Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Jan. 14, 1998, D. 1998, Somm. 288,
obs. B. Audit, available at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=347; Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, D., Oct. 15, 1997, No. 97/08814, slip op.,
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=293; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 23, 1996, No. 94/3859, slip op., note Andr6 Huet,
http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php?test=305; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Grenoble, Apr. 26, 1995, No. 93/1613, slip op., http://witz.jura.unisb.de/CISG/decisions/2604952v.htm; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal],
Grenoble, June 16, 1993, No. 92/4223, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/
overview.php?test=90; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, A, Apr. 22,
1992, slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=222.
70.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Colmar, le ch., Oct. 24, 1990,
slip op., http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview.php? test=578 (holding that the choice
of law appearing on the forms of one party was inapplicable).
71.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Sept. 13, 1995, No.
93/4126, slip op., note Witz, http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/overview. php?test=157.
72.
ICC Award No. 10329 (2000), reprinted in KLUWER LAW INT'L, 29
YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 108 (2004); ICC Awards Nos. 9448 (1999), 9187
(1999), 9083 (1999), 8769 (1996), 8574 (1996), 8482 (1996), 8453 (1995), 8213 (1995)
7754 (1995), 7645 (1995), reprinted in
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
11
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, No. 2 (2000); ICC Award No. 8855

(1997), reprinted in 127 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1070 (2000) (Fr.). ICC
Awards Nos. 8769 and 8213 expressly provided for the application of the CISG.
73.
China Nat. Metal Prods. Imp./Exp. Co. v. Apex Digital, Inc., 141 F. Supp.
2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (CIETAC Award); ICC Awards Nos. 9887 (1999), 9773 (1999),
9574 (1998), 9117 (1998), 8786 (1997), 8962 (1997), 8716 (1997), 8740 (1996), 8247
(1996),

reprinted in INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

11 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

ARBITRATION BULLETIN; ICC Award No. 8501 (1996), reprinted in 128 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1164 (2001) (Fr.); ICC Award No. 9771 (2001), reprinted in
KLUWER LAW INT'L, 29. YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 46 (2004); ICC Award
No. 8817 (1997), reprinted in KLUWER LAW INT'L, 25 YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 355 (2000); Hamburg Friendly Arbitration Award of Dec. 29, 1998,
reprinted in KLUWER LAW INT'L, 24 YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 13 (1999);
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law governing their contract because their contract referred to a
74
standard contract that contained a standard choice of law clause.
Thus, in 60% of the cases, the parties had not provided for the
applicable law.
Perhaps no conclusions can be drawn from this study. The data
gathered is obviously very limited, since thousands of international
contracts of sale are concluded everyday, and this Article has only
reviewed a few dozen. Furthermore, this Article has only reviewed
contracts that led to a dispute. One could argue that many contracts
exist that are better drafted and do not give rise to litigation precisely
because they are sufficiently well drafted. This is probably true to
some extent, but it is likely that the general trend revealed by the
study would not be entirely contradicted by a larger study, even of
contracts performed without any difficulty. It may therefore be that
the percentage of buyers and sellers actually providing for the law
governing their contracts is higher than what the cases reveal.
At the same time, a significant aspect of the data is hard to
interpret. Many of the judgments applying the CISG do not mention
any choice of law clause. Although they sometimes give no reason
why they find that the Convention applies, they usually hold that it is
applicable because the places of business of the parties were in
different Contracting States. It cannot be ruled out that these
contracts contained a choice of law clause but that the court did not
find it relevant in assessing whether the CISG applied. Indeed, if the
clause provided for the application of the law of origin of one of the
parties, which would be the most likely possibility, it would not be
relevant to the determination of the applicability of the CISG. If the
law of a Contracting State is chosen by the parties, it is now almost
universally held that this refers to the CISG, which is the applicable
law to such contracts in the law of the Contracting State. 75 In other
words, whether the parties chose the law of a Contracting State to
govern their contracts is irrelevant as far as the applicability of the
CISG is concerned. Yet the Convention allows parties to opt out of
it. 76 A choice of law by the parties is therefore not completely

Zurich Chamber of Commerce Award No. 273/1995 (1996), reprinted in KLUWER LAW
INT'L, 23 YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 128 (1998); Hamburg Chamber of
Commerce Award of Sept. 4, 1996, reprinted in KLUWER LAW INT'L, 22 YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 51 (1997); Hamburg Chamber of Commerce Partial Award
of Mar. 21, 1996, reprinted in KLUWER LAW INT'L, 22 YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 35 (1997).
74.
ICC Award No. 8782 (1997), reprintedin KLUWER LAW INT'L, 28 YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39 (2003).

75.
See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the
InternationalSale of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 314, 314 (2005).
76.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 6.
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insignificant. Although its solution seems now to be settled in several
jurisdictions, in particular in the United States, Germany, and
France, an issue clearly arises. One could expect a court to mention
the choice of law clause and rule that the chosen law includes the
CISG, or alternatively that the choice does not amount to an
exclusion of the Convention for the purpose of its Article 6. Indeed,
most of the judgments mentioning a choice of law went on to say that
77
It
the CISG applied irrespective of the choice made by the parties.
is therefore very difficult to interpret the judgments that remain
silent in this respect. Although there is no direct evidence to support
such a conclusion, this Article maintains that most of those decisions
dealt with contracts that were silent on the applicable law and that
the reason why they did not mention the clause is simply that there
was none. If that is the case, it may well be that the percentage of
contracts actually providing for a choice of law is much lower than
25%.
If the data gives an accurate sense of the proportion of parties
that provide for the applicable law in their contracts, it is hard not to
be very pessimistic about the degree of legal sophistication of the
parties involved in international sales. If the parties fail to provide
for the applicable law to their contracts, it must mean that they are
just not concerned with the applicable regime governing their
agreements. Theoretically, one could probably argue that the parties
could be very much aware of the applicable law even without actually
agreeing on it. After all, there are default conflict of laws rules that
provide for the applicable law when the parties have not reached an
agreement in this respect. And since the CISG has been applicable,
one could even argue that they are not even needed anymore, as the
CISG governs automatically sales concluded between parties having
their places of business in different Contracting States. In other
words, it may well be that it is because international buyers and
sellers know that the CISG applies that they do not bother providing
for the applicable law.
These theoretical explanations are completely unrealistic. To
begin with, it is difficult to see how the parties could rely on the
default conflict rules in contract matters. In most jurisdictions, these
rules are some of the most unpredictable rules of the conflict of
laws.78 In most European countries, pursuant to Article 4 of the 1980
Rome Convention on the Applicable Law to Contractual Obligations,

77.
See Franco Ferrari, Trimunale di Vigevano: Specific Aspects of the CISG
Uniformly Dealt With, 20 J.L. & COM. 225, 233-34 (2005).
78.
See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: the Validity
Exception to the Convention of Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 18 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (noting that one of the key rationales for the CISG was to reduce the need
to resort to unpredictable conflict of laws rules).
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the applicable law would be the law of the seller, unless the contract
is more closely connected to another jurisdiction or, in other words,
unless the proper law of the contract is another law. 79 Because all
connections between a contract and a jurisdiction can be taken into
consideration for the purposes of this rule, an argument can be made
in most of the cases that the contract is actually governed by the law
of the buyer.80 Ultimately, a court will decide, but in the meantime,
the parties have no certainty as to the applicable law. In the United
States, most states would apply the law which as the most
appropriate relation or most significant relationship with the
transaction and the parties, which could hardly be more predictable
for non-specialists. 8 ' It is therefore more likely that parties not
providing for the applicable law in their contracts are, whether
consciously or not, neglecting the issue of the legal regime governing
their contracts. It is true that the rule providing for the application of
the CISG when the parties have their places of business in different
Contracting States is very predictable, but it may not be realistic to
expect that international buyers and sellers knew about the CISG so
quickly after its entry into force and immediately relied on it. To the
contrary, there are studies that show both that many lawyers do not
know of the CISG8 2 and that when they do know of it, they tend to
advise their clients to exclude its application because it has not yet
been experimented with and litigated to a sufficient extent.8 3 In
addition, it should be stressed that the CISG has only completed a
partial harmonization of international sale law and that parties
sophisticated enough to know the CISG a few years after its entry in
force should also know that a national law should still be chosen to
govern the outstanding issues, in particular to regulate the validity of
84
the contract and its enforceability.
Therefore, most parties that fail to provide for the applicable law
neglect the issue of the legal regime governing their contracts. A few

79.
See id. at 15 (noting that the law of the seller's place of business often
applies as the default rule to contracts of sale).
80.
Id. By exception to this rule, the 1955 Hague Convention provides for the
application of the law of the seller when the case is brought before the courts of one of
the nine signatories, including France, Italy, and the Scandinavian States. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
81.
Id.; see also WILLIAM M. RICHMAN
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 264 (3d ed. 2003).
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82.
On the ignorance of U.S. lawyers, see generally William S. Dodge, Teaching
the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72 (2000); Michael Wallace Gordon, Some
Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contracts Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT
Principlesas Reflected in One State's (Florida)Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2)
Members of the Bar with an InternationalPractice,and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
361 (1998).
83.
See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.A (the scope of the harmonization).
84.
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of them may have conducted hard negotiations on the issue and failed
to reach any agreement. But the truth of the matter is very probably
much simpler: the parties are just unaware of the importance of the
applicable law and of the choice of law issue generally. The law
governing the contract is just not an issue ex ante. It may be that
other rules appear to them as more important, such as rules
preventing the sale (e.g., the right to export or import goods) or rules
increasing the costs of the sale (e.g., customs duties). But any rule
that does not have an immediate effect is neglected.
It therefore seems possible to say that the vast majority of
international sellers and buyers are unsophisticated, legally
speaking. They do not address any legal issue ex ante. They are not
aware of the fact that the applicable law could void their contracts or
that it could contain default rules that they could like or dislike.
These parties see the law solely as a mechanism for resolving
disputes. Indeed, many of them include a jurisdiction clause in their
contracts but fail to provide for the applicable law. 85 For these
parties, the law will be applied by an adjudicator ex post if a dispute
arises, but it has no relevance at the stage of the conclusion of the
contract. In this respect, the arbitral cases are very revealing. As
already mentioned, in 60% of the cases the parties failed to provide
for the applicable law yet provided for the jurisdiction of international
arbitrators to settle the dispute. 8 6 These parties were sufficiently
sophisticated to be aware of the issue of which court would try any
dispute arising out of the contract and of the difference between a
court and an arbitral tribunal, but they were not sufficiently
sophisticated to add a provision as to the applicable law. Maybe the
parties did not really see the difference between choosing the
competent court and choosing the applicable law, but what is clear is
that in their minds, legal rules and disputes were intimately
connected.
This conclusion allows the examination of the issue of the
unification of international law of sale from a new perspective. If the
vast majority of commercial parties involved in international sales
are unsophisticated parties that are not concerned with the law
governing their transactions, it is fair to wonder whether an
enterprise such as the CISG is beneficial at all for international
buyers and sellers.
One possible explanation for this data could be the low value of
the transactions which lead to these judgments. Parties involved in
low-value transactions could be less sophisticated than parties
involved in higher-value transactions. Moreover, even sophisticated

85.
86.

See discussion and cases cited supraPart III.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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parties could engage in a cost/benefit analysis and conclude that the
low value of their transactions does not make it worthwhile to incur
costs to determine the applicable legal regime. It seems, however,
that this explanation is contradicted by the facts since the study of
the cases where the parties had not chosen the applicable law does
not confirm this intuitive idea. 87 It seems that no correlation can be
drawn between the failure to provide for the applicable law and the
value at stake in these cases. Indeed, the forty-four decisions that
mentioned both the value of the sale and the fact that the parties had
not chosen the applicable law are almost evenly divided between
cases involving sales between $10,000 and $50,000, sales between
$100,000 and $500,000, and sales over $1 million. 88 If one only
considers the U.S. cases, the value of the sales is most often greater
89
than $1 million.
The purpose behind the treaty was to increase international
trade. 90 The negotiators seemed to believe that the diversity of
national laws would hinder commercial parties from concluding
international sales and that the harmonization of international sale
law would remedy this by increasing legal certainty. The study shows
that not only are there other ways to ensure the legal certainty of the
legal regime applicable to the contract but also that the parties are
not concerned with the law applicable to their contract. As already
argued, it is very likely that the reason why they do not choose the
applicable law is not that they are happy with the default applicable
law but because they are not aware of the importance of the
applicable law. It is very likely that they just do not ask the question
and thus do not know which law governs their contract. International
sellers and buyers generally conclude sales without knowing, and
indeed even wondering, which law governs their contracts. It follows
that it does not seem that they are looking for legal certainty ex ante.
It was believed that unifying the international law of sales would
reduce the transaction costs of the parties for two reasons: the parties
would not have to bargain over the applicable law anymore and no
parties would have to learn a foreign law in order to understand how
to use it best at the conclusion of the contract. The cases reveal that
none of these costs is actually incurred by the majority of
international sellers and buyers. First, the parties do not bargain

87.
See discussion and cases cited supra Part III.
88.
Respectively, the divisions are 25%, 27.2%, and 22.7% of the contracts.
Sixteen percent of the contracts were worth between $50,000 and $100,000. The figure
does not include most of the arbitral awards because they are almost invariably
published without any figure. See id.
89.
That is true in seven out of twelve contracts. See cases cited supra notes
60-61.
90.

THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED, supra note 4, at 79.
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over the applicable law; their contract is usually silent in this respect.
Second, none of them puts any effort into learning the foreign
applicable law. A good reason for it is that none of them really knows
which law governs the contract, but more generally, none of them
cares ex ante. Parties only care for the product and the price.
The CISG enterprise has tried to save costs that do not exist for
the majority of the parties. From an efficiency perspective, whether
the Convention should have been entered into in the first place is
therefore very doubtful. The resources dedicated to the passage of the
treaty are not increasing the welfare of the actors that were targeted
as potential beneficiaries. Of course, other actors have obviously
benefited from the enterprise of negotiating the CISG, such as the
negotiators themselves. However, if the treaty is not useful to
commercial parties themselves, the benefits conferred to the
negotiators cannot be justified. 9 1
Some scholars have argued that not only would the CISG not
save commercial parties transaction costs but that it would actually
increase such costs. 92 Because of the poor quality of its rules, the
CISG would force parties to opt out of the Convention when they
would not necessarily have done so had a better national law been
applicable. Their transaction costs would thus increase. 93 The cases
that this Article reviewed illustrate that for most commercial parties,
this criticism is unfounded.
Because the parties are generally
unsophisticated, they do not appreciate the importance of the legal
rules governing their contracts to such an extent that they neglect to
include a choice of law clause in their contract. The parties probably
do not even know which law applies to their contract, making it hard
to see how they could be aware of the applicability and content of the
CISG. It may be that if the parties were told the content of a given
provision in the CISG and told that they could opt out of it, they
would actually do so, but that just does not happen. The CISG does
not increase their transaction costs because the applicable law is not
a transaction cost for those parties. The existence of the CISG is
irrelevant to them. For most parties, therefore, the justification for
the CISG can only be an ex post benefit, because it is neutral ex ante.
The cases that this Article has reviewed show that most
international buyers and sellers are unsophisticated parties that are
not concerned with the legal regime governing their contracts when
they conclude them. It seems clear, therefore, that the CISG has not
brought them any ex ante benefit. Legal certainty is not a concern at

91.
But see Stephan, supra note 8, at 750-51 (arguing that unification improves
the skills of the lawyers involved in the transactions to the benefit of the society as a
whole).
92.
See supra Part II.C.
93.
See id.
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that stage of the contracting process, and contracting with merchants
from other jurisdictions is no more costly than contracting
domestically. The legal regime governing their contracts did not
prevent most parties from concluding them. The aim of the drafters of
the CISG was the removal of legal barriers to increase international
trade, but it seems clear that these barriers have been overstated.
Although lawyers and legal scholars may generally overestimate
the importance of the law for economic actors, not all commercial
parties are legally unsophisticated. The data gathered concerns
international sales and shows that commercial parties from that
industry are generally unsophisticated. Commercial parties from
other industries, however, may be far more sophisticated. It is
interesting to note that, on average, parties that refer their disputes
to the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce provide for the applicable law in 80% of the
cases, 94 while they only do in 35% of the sales cases. 95 Parties
concluding fewer contracts for a much greater value may be far more
concerned with the legal regime governing their contracts. Whether
they could benefit ex ante from harmonization of the law governing
their industry is an entirely different issue.
It must also be stressed that the survey findings do not preclude
the conclusion that parties may benefit from the CISG in some
situations. First, unsophisticated parties may not benefit from the
CISG ex ante, but they may ex post. These parties will obviously not
reduce their transaction costs after the contract has been concluded,
but they may welcome more legal certainty if the CISG increases it
after negotiations. Second, a minority of international sellers and
buyers have to be legally sophisticated. These parties do not comprise
all of the parties that provide for the law governing their contract,
since many of them may do so mechanically, without actually
perceiving the consequences of making such provision. But it is clear
that some parties, in particular those selling high value goods on a

94.

See

INT'L

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

16

INTERNATIONAL

COURT

OF

ARBITRATION BULLETIN, No. 1, at 11 (2005) (8% of the contracts underlying the
disputes referred to ICC arbitration in 2004); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 15
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, No. 1, at 13 (2004) (82% of the

contracts underlying the disputes referred to ICC arbitration in 2003); INT'L CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, 14 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, No. 1, at 14

(2003) (82% of the contracts underlying the disputes referred to ICC arbitration in
2002); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 13 INTERNATIONAL COURT

OF ARBITRATION

BULLETIN, No. 1, at 12 (2002) (78% of the contracts underlying the disputes referred to
ICC arbitration in 2001).
95.
The ICC states that the disputes referred to ICC arbitration involve all
sectors of the economy, but more frequently they concern construction, engineering,
energy, and information technology. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 15
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, No. 1, at 13 (2004) (a third of the

cases submitted to ICC arbitration in 2003).
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much less frequent basis than average international traders, are
concerned with the applicable legal regime. This Article will now
explore whether the CISG has at least been beneficial to one of these
two groups.

IV. WHO CAN BENEFIT FROM THE CISG?

The data provided in Part III identifies two hypotheses in which
international buyers and sellers may be able to benefit from the
CISG. First, unsophisticated parties could benefit from the CISG ex
post. They are not concerned ex ante with the legal regime that will
govern their transaction. In particular, they do not seek to ensure
that their contract will be enforceable. However, if an issue arises,
they may then wonder what the law is and seek legal advice. At that
stage of the contracting process, they may become concerned with the
legal regime governing their contract. The CISG could thus be
beneficial if it could facilitate the resolution of the issue, which may
later turn into a dispute. That resolution could include determination
of the governing legal regime. Then the parties could determine more
easily or with more certainty what their rights are under this legal
regime and negotiate or litigate accordingly. In other words, the CISG
could increase legal certainty and decrease the litigation or prelitigation costs of the parties. These ex post benefits would be more
convincing than ex ante benefits. One reason is that because an issue
would have arisen, the parties would care for the applicable legal
regime and would incur the costs of determining the applicable law.
Another reason is that because the parties are unsophisticated, they
would not have provided for the applicable law to the contract ex
ante. Thus, the alternative to the CISG would not be a choice of law
providing clearly for the applicable legal regime but a default choice
96
of law rule, which would typically be rather unpredictable.
Second, as explained above, some sophisticated parties incur
higher transaction costs when contracting internationally. 97 That is
the case for the parties that would not retain a lawyer for domestic
transactions but would do so for international transactions.
Harmonizing international sale law would allow them to avoid
negotiating over the applicable legal regime and learning the content
of the applicable foreign law, which should therefore reduce their
98
transaction costs.

96.
97.
98.
comparable

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
Some very sophisticated parties, on the other hand, would incur
transaction costs even for domestic transactions. Their transaction costs
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Although these two groups of parties are different, both could
benefit from the harmonization of the applicable law for the same
reason. In an international context, the harmonization of the
applicable law would make determining the governing legal regime
much easier. It would be common to both parties and foreign to none.
The parties could thus save the costs of determining and learning the
governing legal regime. This would save litigation costs for
unsophisticated parties and transaction costs for sophisticated
parties. However, it must be emphasized that these benefits would
only occur if the harmonized legal regime were of equal quality to the
national laws that would have been applicable in its absence.
Otherwise, the poor quality of the harmonized law could eventually
make the parties worse off than if a national law had been deemed
applicable. This Article next examines whether the harmonization
achieved by the CISG has provided the expected simplicity in the
determination of the applicable law as well as a quality legal regime.
A. Scope of the Harmonization
The scope of the harmonization achieved by the CISG is limited.
It does not apply to the validity of the contract, any of its clauses, or
the transfer of ownership.9 9 While a complete harmonization of the
applicable law would clearly make it easier to determine the legal
regime governing the contract, it is unclear that a partial
harmonization would be beneficial at all.
Indeed, the limited scope of the CISG has several consequences.
First, because the CISG does not govern the validity of the
contract, 10 0 it has no effect on the potential for parties to shop for
efficient mandatory rules. Second, for those issues that are not
governed by the unified law, it remains necessary to determine which
domestic law applies and, for at least one party, to learn it. In other
words, a partial harmonization can only partially reduce the
additional transaction or litigation costs that international
contracting entails. Such an international sale law only reduces costs
with regard to those issues that are covered by the harmonization
and does not prevent the parties from having to determine, and for
one party to learn, the domestic regime applicable to the outstanding
issues.
It is important to note that it will not only be necessary to
determine the domestic governing law for those issues not covered

would therefore remain unaffected by the origin of the applicable law, be it domestic,
foreign, or international. See id.
99.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 4.
100.
Id.
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expressly by the harmonization, but also which national
interpretation of some of the issues covered by the harmonization
should prevail. Because no final interpretation of the provisions of the
international sale law will be possible, 101 each jurisdiction may
develop its own interpretation of the law's provisions. One would hope
that the courts of the Contracting States would try to follow the
exhortation of the CISG to take into account its international
character when interpreting it, 102 but the accounts of parochial
interpretations are numerous 1 3 and were probably predictable. If one
also believes that the provisions of the CISG are indeed vague and
unclear and will require substantial interpretation, 104 it is not
difficult to predict that a substantial part of the provisions of the
unified law will not be understood in the same way in the various
Contracting States. Local interpretations will develop, and thus local
CISG laws. Parties that care about the actual regime governing their
contracts will therefore need to determine which interpretation will
prevail. Article 7(2) of the CISG directs courts of the Contracting
States to ultimately settle such issues "in conformity with the law
' 10 5
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
Even with regard to issues governed by the unified law, it will be
necessary to determine the domestic law applicable and learn its
content.
The partial harmonization creates additional complications. The
mere fact that the contract is governed by more than one applicable
regime creates new legal issues that need to be resolved. Rules are
not independent from each other and frequently build on distinctions
existing in other areas of the law. In other words, rules are
interrelated, and if the relationship between them is broken, one rule
cannot be used anymore without further analysis. French law
provides an interesting example. Under the French domestic law of
sale, exculpatory clauses may be declared invalid depending on the
grounds for the buyer's remedy. 106 French law traditionally has
distinguished between actions for hidden defects and actions for
goods that do not conform to the contract. 10 7 If the buyer sought a
remedy because the goods contained a hidden defect, the clause was

101.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 452-53 (discussing the lack of an
international commercial court of last resort to hear cases under the CISG and the
result of divergent interpretations of the treaty's provisions).
102.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 7(1).
103.
See Murray, supra note 33, at 369 (discussing such accounts in the United
States); see also DiMatteo et al., supra note 29, at 299.
104.
See Gillette & Scott, supra note 8,at 474-75.
105.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 7(2).
106.
See Philippe Malinvaud, Redhibitory Defects and Their Importance in
Contemporary Society, 50 TUL. L. REV. 517, 519 (1976).
107.
Id.

1546

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:1511

invalid. 10 8 On the other hand, if the ground for his claim was the non
conformity of the goods, the clause was valid. 10 9 Under the CISG,
French domestic law still governs the validity of any of the clauses of
the contract, including exculpatory clauses. 110 Yet French domestic
law refers to a distinction (action for non-conforming goods and action
for goods containing a hidden defect) which does not exist under the
CISG. 111 The applicability of two legal regimes therefore creates a
new legal problem that needs to be resolved. Determining the content
of the rules governing the contract therefore becomes more complex
for parties willing to determine the applicable legal regime. An
additional transaction or litigation cost is thus incurred by the
parties.
The limited scope of the harmonization achieved by the CISG
also limits its benefits for international sellers and buyers. It reduces
their transaction or litigation costs to a limited extent and increases
them in other manners. The CISG is therefore only beneficial if the
reduction is more important than the increase.
B. Quality of the Harmonization
This Article has already shown that several legal scholars have
11 2
challenged the quality of the harmonization achieved by the CISG.
In particular, Gillette and Scott argue that the political economy of
the Convention would lead its drafters to adopt rules that would be
disfavored by parties. 113 Because the drafters would have important
incentives to reach an agreement when such agreement would in fact
be very difficult to reach, the rules that they would eventually adopt
would be the result of important compromises and would try to
accommodate as many drafters as possible. Hence, the rules would be
more vague and rely more heavily on standards that could be
interpreted differently. Gillette and Scott emphasize that the CISG
relies heavily on standards, which seems to support their
14
argument.
If these scholars are correct that the Convention provides a
significantly worse legal regime than domestic laws, two
consequences may follow. First, sophisticated parties may opt out of
the Convention as a whole or from some of its provisions, as the

108.
Id. at 522.
109.
Id.
110.
CISG, supra note 3, at art. 4(a).
111.
Id. at art. 35 (discussing nonconformity of goods but making no distinction
between hidden defects and nonconforming goods).
112.
See discussion supra Part II.
113.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 469.
114.
Id. at 474-75.
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Convention allows them to do.1 15 That is the conclusion that Gillette
and Scott reach; they argue that since vague rules are unhelpful to
parties because they provide no actual guidance and allow for moral
hazard, parties will disfavor the rules of the CISG and want to opt
out of them. 116 Far from reducing the transaction costs of the parties,
the Convention would actually increase them. Second, many
inefficient rules would still remain applicable. Unsophisticated
parties would not have had the opportunity to opt out from them ex
ante, because they would not have cared for the applicable legal
regime at the time. When a dispute would arise, it would be unlikely
that the parties agree on a better rule, as the default rule would
typically favor one of the parties, who would have no incentive to give
up such benefit. But it is important to realize that sophisticated
parties may not find incurring these additional costs worthwhile if
the probability of the contingency is too low. They would therefore opt
out of some of the disfavored rules and leave others applicable
because the costs of opting out of them would be too high. The second
consequence of the poor quality of the harmonization would therefore
be to increase the number of inefficient rules governing the contract.
It is hard to find data either confirming or contradicting the
theory of Gillette and Scott. Cases are generally unhelpful because
the vast majority of them concern unsophisticated parties that are
barely aware of the relevance of the law governing their contract. Yet
a few of the sophisticated parties that provided for the applicable law
went on to exclude the CISG. 17 Some other anecdotal evidence can be
gathered. Professor Bridge states that it has long been the practice of
the Grain and Free Trade Association (GAFTA) and some major oil
companies to exclude the Convention from its forms. 11 8 Professor
Ziegel states that he had "heard it said often that large companies
routinely exclude the Convention from their contracts as the
governing law," but acknowledges that he has no significant data to
support his opinion.11 9 He notes, however, that the reported cases do
not involve well known companies and usually deal with relatively
small claims (less than $10,000), which suggests that major
corporations may exclude the CISG. 120 This Article's survey of the

115.
CISG, supra note 3, at arts. 28, 92-96.
116.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 456.
Three cases out of the 181 reviewed for the purpose of this paper are Fisher
117.
v. Thyssen Mannesmann Handel GMBH, No. 05 C 6193, 2006 WL 211858 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 19, 2006) (sale of steel); Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F.
Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (distribution of software); Northland Power v. Gen.
Elec., 105 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (sale of a gas generator engine).
118.
BP and Shell. See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
§1.03 (1999).
119.
Ziegel, supra note 25, at 341.
Id.
120.
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reported cases does not confirm this analysis. 121 More recently, a
German scholar, Mr. K6hler, conducted a "survey regarding the
relevance of the CISG in legal practice and the exclusion of its
application" in Germany and in the United States. 122 In the United
States, most of the fifty law practitioners who replied stated that the
CISG was "predominantly" or "generally" excluded. 123 Yet even this
anecdotal evidence is hard to interpret. If major corporations
routinely exclude the CISG, one would hope that it would not be
12 4
because of the ignorance of their arguably sophisticated lawyers
but for reasons related to the CISG itself. Corporations could indeed
dislike some of its rules, but they could also dislike the fact that it
forces them to combine several legal regimes, or they may be
unwilling to trust a body of law that has not been experimented with
and litigated to a sufficient extent. That last answer was
predominantly made by the practitioners who replied to Mr. K6hler's
survey, 125 although they also often stated that they could see no
advantage in the application of the CISG and were not of the opinion
126
that the CISG was legally advantageous over national laws.
The only thing one can learn from these examples of exclusion of
the CISG is that no case or contract has partially excluded the
Convention. In all these examples, the Convention was excluded
entirely. This shows either that the CISG is not trusted as a whole, or
that a sufficient number of its provisions have been judged bad
enough by parties to exclude the whole regime. This further shows
that the fear that parties may exclude some of its rules and leave
some others applicable, despite their poor quality, is for the time
being probably theoretical.

121.
The cases involve more than $1 million as often as $10,000. See discussion
supra Part III.
122.
Forthcoming. I am grateful to Mr. Martin Kohler to have allowed me to
cite the data that he gathered. Martin F. Koehler, Survey Regarding the Relevance of
the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Legal
Practiceand the Exclusion of its Application, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu
cisg/biblio/koehler.html.
123.
Of the practitioners who replied, 37.5% stated that that it was excluded
"generally," and 33.3% stated that it was excluded "predominantly." Data provided to
Author by Martin F. Koehler.
124.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
125.
Of the U.S. interviewees, 54.2% stated that the CISG is generally
unknown; 33.3% stated that there is still insufficient case law related to it; and 31.3%
stated that they had insufficient experience in the field of CISG. Data provided to
Author by Martin F. Koehler.
126.
Of the U.S. interviewees, 39.6% stated that they exclude the CISG because
they can see no advantage in its application. As far as the comparison between the
CISG and national laws is concerned, 39.6% stated that neither had decisive
advantages, but 35.4% thought national rules are legally advantageous. Koehler,
supra note 122.
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It could also be argued that the demonstration of Gillette and
Scott does not conclusively show that the CISG is worse than most
domestic laws. Gillette and Scott show that it could be predicted that
the CISG would contain many vague and imprecise rules and that the
CISG indeed uses many of them. 127 But they do not show that the
Indeed, the
CISG is significantly worse than domestic laws.
argument that Gillette and Scott make about the CISG was made
earlier about the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); it was argued
that a private legislature would ultimately propose legislation relying
heavily on vague rules and standards and that the UCC was indeed
very much doing so. 128 In some civil law countries, vague and
imprecise rules are not the sad consequence of an unfortunate
legislative process; rather, they are an ideal, as illustrated by the
continued worship of pieces such as the legendary Napoleonic Civil
Code in France and beyond. 129 It is therefore extremely unclear
whether many commercial parties will regard the CISG as a
significant regression in comparison to their domestic sale law. If
they do not, they would obviously not incur additional transaction
costs to opt out of it.
If it could be shown that the CISG provides for more disfavored
rules than the domestic law that can be practically chosen by the
parties, its applicability could force the parties to further negotiate to
opt out of it in more instances than they would have if a domestic law
had been applicable and would increase the number of applicable
inefficient rules.

V. CONCLUSION

Has the CISG been useful to commercial parties? This Article
indicates that the answer is no for the vast majority of parties and
that it has at best a very limited use for the others.
The question therefore arises whether the enterprise should
have been pursued in the first place. There are two possible answers
to this question. The first is that it should not have been pursued,
because it has been costly for society without being helpful to many
private actors. Indeed, it has been costly for society, not only because
of the negotiations of it, but also the increase in complexity of the law
of the Contracting States and the extra burden on judges who must
apply alternative or mixed legal regimes.

127.
128.

Gillette & Scott, supra note 8, at 473-74.
See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of

Private Legislatures, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 595 (1995).
See, e.g., ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 50, at 103.
129.
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The second answer is that the flaws of the CISG may disappear
one day. The CISG may have been just the first step towards
complete harmonization. This complete harmonization could not be
achieved immediately but no doubt will be one day, and the quality of
the harmonization will also improve. To reach that point, a first step
had to be taken, and that was the CISG. Retrospectively, the CISG
will appear as a transition towards a better world. It will have been a
necessary evil. However, it should not be forgotten that most
international sellers and buyers are not legally sophisticated and may
only benefit from any harmonization of sale law ex post if an issue or
a dispute arises. If one adds the small number of potential
beneficiaries to the costs of pursuing the enterprise for the society, a
wise conclusion would be to direct such efforts to an industry more
likely to benefit from them.

